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Abstract
Hierarchy of social organization is a ubiquitous property of animal and human groups, linked
to resource allocation, collective decisions, individual health, and even to social instability. Experi-
mental evidence shows that both intrinsic abilities of individuals and social reinforcement processes
impact hierarchies; existing mathematical models, however, focus on the latter. Here, we develop
a rigorous model that incorporates both features and explore their synergistic effect on stability
and the structure of hierarchy. For pairwise interactions, we show that there is a trade-off between
relationship stability and having the most talented individuals in the highest ranks. Extending this
to open societies, where individuals enter and leave the population, we show that important societal
effects arise from the interaction between talent and social processes: (i) despite positive global cor-
relation between talent and rank, paradoxically, local correlation is negative, and (ii) the removal
of an individual can induce a series of rank reversals. We show that the mechanism underlying the
latter is the removal of an older individual of limited talent, who nonetheless was able to suppress
the rise of younger, more talented individuals.
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Introduction. Hierarchy is a central organizing principle of complex systems, manifest-
ing itself in various forms in biological, social, and technological systems [1]. Therefore to
understand complex systems, it is crucial to quantitatively describe hierarchies [2–5] and to
identify their origins and benefits [6, 7]. Among the various forms of hierarchy, here we are
concerned with social hierarchies emerging through competition, including dominance and
status hierarchies or socioeconomic stratification [8, 9]. Ultimately, such hierarchy represents
a ranking of individuals based on social consensus: a high ranking individual is expected to
win a conflict against a low ranking one. This type of organization is present in societies
ranging from insects to primates and humans [3, 10–12], and has been linked to resource
allocation, individual health, collective decisions, and social stability [7, 13–15].
The prevalence of social hierarchies motivated a long history of theoretical research in
statistical physics and mathematical biology [6, 16–19]. The unifying theme in explaining
the emergence of hierarchies is positive reinforcement of differences known as the winner
effect: initially equally ranked individuals repeatedly participate in pairwise competitions,
and after an individual wins, the probability that they win later competitions increases.
Conditions for hierarchies to emerge under this mechanism and their structure has been
thoroughly investigated [9, 11, 18–20].
Yet, from experiments focusing on animal groups, we known that in addition to social
reinforcement, intrinsic attributes also play a critical role in hierarchy formation [9, 11]. The
relative strength of the two effects depends on context; however, it was observed that they
both affect hierarchies ranging from species with relatively simple social interactions, such
as cichlid fish [21], to species that form highly complex societies, such as primates [13, 22].
Despite the clear indication from experiments that both talent and reinforcement matter,
we are lacking general theoretical understanding of their synergistic impact [23, 24]. Here,
we develop a rigorous model incorporating both and show that this captures a much richer
landscape. For pairwise interactions, we show a trade-off between relationship stability and
having more talented individuals be the high-ranked leaders. We then extend the model to
open populations, where individuals enter and leave the group, and we characterize both the
global and the local structure of hierarchies.
Another pressing issue is to understand the response of hierarchical structure to perturba-
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tion, e.g., the effect of removing an individual. In particular, animal behavior experts must
often make strategic decisions to remove individuals from captive societies due to health
issues or in attempt to promote social stability, which sometimes lead to unanticipated re-
organization of hierarchy and even societal collapse [14, 25]. We show herein that if either
talent or social reinforcement dominate hierarchy formation, the associated models predict
smooth response and no rearrangement. It is only if their effects are equally important, that
removal of an individual can lead to a non-trivial series of rank reversals.
Model. Our starting point is a classic model by Bonabeau et al. that considers only social
reinforcement [6]. It describes a group with N members, where the rank of each member is
determined by its ability to defeat others in pairwise competitions. This ability is quantified
by a score xi(t), where the subscript indexes the individuals. The scores are initially identical
(xi(t = 0) ≡ 0) and they change through two discrete-time processes. First, through positive
feedback: In each time step, participants are randomly paired to compete with each other,
and the winner increases its score by δ. Individual i wins against j with probability
Qij(t) =
1
1 + exp[−β(xi(t)− xj(t))] , (1)
where β is an inverse temperature-like parameter: for large β the outcome of the fight is
deterministic, for β = 0 both parties have equal chance to win. The second process is
forgetting: The effect of a fight wears off exponentially, i.e., xi(t) is reduced by µxi(t) (0 ≤
µ ≤ 1) in each time step. Describing the full process with the deterministic equation
xi(t+ 1) = (1− µ)xi(t) + δ
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
Qij(t), (2)
it was shown that, depending on the relative strength of reinforcement and decay, the model
supports either egalitarian (xi ≡ 0) or hierarchical (xi 6≡ 0) steady state solutions [6, 26].
To introduce intrinsic attributes, we offset the score of each participant in Eq. (1) by base
abilities bi and bj:
Qij(t) =
1
1 + exp[−β(xi(t) + bi − xj(t)− bj)] . (3)
Parameter b quantifies talents that are independent of social processes, yet are relevant
to conflict outcomes, such as strength or intelligence. This modification, although formally
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FIG. 1. Fairness and stability (N = 2). (a) Score difference as a function of , without (black)
and with difference in talent (red). If ∆b > 0, for large  only one hierarchical solution exists corre-
sponding to the fair ranking, i.e., rank is determined by talent (solid); and through a discontinuous
transition at c (vertical line) a new solution emerges corresponding to the opposite, unfair ordering
(dashed). (b) The probability Q that the dominant defeats the subordinate quantifies the stability
of a hierarchical relationship; as  decreases, social stability increases. Shown for the fair (solid)
and unfair (dashed) states. (c) Critical point, c as a function of ∆b¯.
simple, requires new mathematical description and leads to series of non-trivial behaviors
and unanticipated emergent properties.
Two individuals. To understand the consequences of intrinsic differences, it is insightful
to first investigate a population of N = 2. The deterministic equation describing the steady
state is
0 = −µ∆x+ δ
(
2
1 + exp [−β(∆x+ ∆b)] − 1
)
, (4)
where ∆x = x1−x2 and ∆b = b1− b2 ≥ 0. Introducing dimensionless quantities ∆x¯ = β∆x,
∆b¯ = β∆b and  = µ/(δβ) leads to
0 = −∆x¯+ 2
1 + exp
[−∆x¯−∆b¯] − 1, (5)
meaning that the steady state is determined by the talent difference and a single parameter
 measuring the relative strength of decay to social reinforcement [27].
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Systematically changing , we observe a transition at c(∆b¯) separating regimes with one
and two stable solutions; the nature of the transition depends on the presence of intrinsic
differences. If ∆b¯ = 0 (Fig. 1a black line), we recover the original model: For  > c(0) we
find one solution, representing the egalitarian state ∆x¯ = 0, and at c(0) two symmetric
hierarchical solutions (∆x¯1 = −∆x¯2 6= 0) emerge through a pitchfork bifurcation. If ∆b¯ > 0
(Fig. 1a red line): For  > c(∆b¯) we again find just one solution; this solution, however, is
not egalitarian (∆x¯ > 0), but it is “fair” in that the more talented individual outranks the
less talented. At c(∆b¯) a new stable solution appears through a discontinuous transition
supporting the opposite order, which is “unfair”, meaning that the less talented outrank the
more talented. In other words, social reinforcement can outpace intrinsic abilities. We call
the ∆x¯ > 0 solution “fair” and the ∆x¯ < 0 one “unfair”, since high-ranked individuals tend
to have better access to resources, more impact on collective decisions, and higher chance to
foster offspring.
Figure 1c shows the dependence of c on ∆b¯. In general, no closed-form solution is avail-
able; limiting cases, however, can be worked out analytically: for small differences we find
(c − 1/2) ∼ ∆b¯2/3 and for large differences c = ∆b¯−1. The latter indicates that increas-
ing talent difference or decreasing reinforcement pushes the system to a regime where only
the fair solution exists. Since the fair solution intuitively benefits society, this prompts the
question: what is the role of social reinforcement?
To answer this question, we quantify the stability of a dominant-subordinate relationship
with Q, the probability that the dominant wins a conflict, Q ≈ 1/2 indicates an unstable
relationship and Q ≈ 1 a well-defined relationship. Stable relationships reduce overall aggres-
sion and are positively associated with individual health [15]. Figure 1b shows that strong
social reinforcement (high δ and thus low ) increases Q, revealing a fundamental trade-
off between stability and fairness: stable relationships require strong social reinforcement;
however, strong reinforcement allows for unfair hierarchical states. Similar trade-off was ex-
perimentally observed in rankings of products in a marketplace competing for the attention
of consumers: strong social reinforcement led to less accuracy in selecting the highest quality
product, and to larger differences in market share [28].
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Open populations. So far we focused on the relationship of two individuals, now we turn
our attention to larger, changing populations. We study groups of N individuals where the
talent of each individual is drawn randomly from a distribution p(b). We initially allow the
population to reach a stable ranking. Then in each step, we remove a random individual and
add a new member i to the bottom of the society, i.e., xi = 0, and again allow the population
to reach a stable ranking.
For simplicity we restrict our investigation to the β →∞ limit, in which case Qij becomes
a step function. This allows us to explicitly formulate the condition for two consecutively
ordered individuals to reverse ranks during the evolution of the hierarchy [29]:
b(k + 1)− b(k) > ∆x ≡ δ
µ(N − 1) , (6)
where b(k) is the talent of the individual ranked kth (note that k = 1 is the top and k = N
is the bottom rank); and ∆x is the score difference of two consecutively ranked individuals
x(k)− x(k + 1) which turns out to be independent of their ranks [29]. Therefore, ∆x is the
additional talent needed to overcome the advantage of having higher rank. Parameters δ
and µ only effect the system through ∆x; therefore treating ∆x as a parameter completely
specifies the dynamics. The β → ∞ limit allows us to study a simplified representation
of the dynamics in Eqs. (2) and (3): We check each consecutively ranked individual and if
Eq. (6) is satisfied, we reverse their order; we repeat this until no more pairs are reversed.
In the Supplemental Material, we derive various properties of the hierarchy through exact
combinatorics and meanfield-like approximations [29].
The talent b of an individual represents an intrinsic ability or a combination of abilities
that influence the outcome of a fight. In our analysis we derive a number of properties
of social hierarchies for general continuous talent distribution p(b), including heavy-tailed
distributions. Whenever specific p(b) is necessary for calculations or simulations, we focus on
the standard normal distribution. Indeed, body size, intelligence, and other relevant abilities
are often normally distributed.
We now systematically investigate the structure of the emergent hierarchy as a function
of ∆x, the additional talent difference needed to overcome rank difference. We measure
correlation between rank and talent (τtal) and between rank and experience (τexp) using
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FIG. 2. Talent-rank correlation. (a) Kendall’s tau as a function of ∆x. Global talent-rank (red)
and experience-rank (green) correlation shows a crossover between talent and experience dominated
limiting cases. Counter-intuitively, we find that locally talent and rank are anti-correlated (blue) as
shown for local windows of increasing size w. (b) Local rank-talent anti-correlation. In the crossover
regime, the expected talent increases with rank (red), yet the probability that an individual’s
immediate superior is less talented is greater than 1/2 (green). In (a) and (b), results are shown for
populations of N = 100, continuous lines are analytical solutions [29]. Data points are simulations
of the dynamics defined in Eq. (6), representing an average of 10,000 independent samples and
error bars provide the 95% CI.
Kendall’s tau coefficient, where experience is the amount of time an individual has spent in
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the population. For example, τtal = 1 indicates talent completely determines rank and τtal = 0
indicates no correlation. Analytical calculations and simulations show that for large ∆x, rank
is dominated by experience, meaning that the only way to advance in the hierarchy is if a
higher ranking individual is removed; and for small ∆x rank is dominated by talent (Fig. 2a).
These two limiting cases are separated by a regime where both talent and experience matter,
theory predicts that the crossover point, where τtal = τexp = 1/2, is ∆xc ≈ 0.36 for N = 100.
Experimental measurement of τtal is challenging since it requires exact identification of
the relevant talents; determining τexp, however, is straight forward. Indeed, Tung et al. es-
tablished small captive groups of macaques by introducing animals one-by-one into an enclo-
sure and found that the Spearman’s correlation between rank and experience is ρexp = 0.61,
demonstrating that some real systems are in fact near the crossover point [13].
In addition to global correlations, we also quantify local orderedness by calculating τtal(w),
the talent-rank correlation averaged over a sliding window of length w. Counter-intuitively,
Fig. 2a shows that in the crossover regime τtal(w) is negative, meaning that locally rank and
talent are anti-correlated. Figure 2b provides an additional aspect of this paradox situation:
The expected talent 〈b(k)〉 of an individual ranked kth at a random time step monotonically
increases with rank; yet the probability that the (k − 1)th individual, the one immediately
outranking the kth, is less talented than the kth is greater than 1/2.
To understand the mechanism producing the local anti-correlation, first consider two
consecutive individuals forming an ordered pair with respect to talent, i.e., b(k) < b(k−1). If
a new individual arrives with talent b such that b(k)+∆x < b and b(k−1) < b < b(k−1)+∆x,
it can pass the kth individual, but cannot pass the (k− 1)th, lodging itself between the two
and creating an unordered pair. Once an unordered pair exists, i.e., b(k) > b(k − 1), any
individual passing the kth will necessarily pass the (k − 1)th too. Therefore an unordered
pair will remain unordered until one of the pair is removed. This asymmetry in creating
ordered and unordered pairs is responsible for the local anti-correlation.
Finally, we also investigate the effect of removing an individual. We find that in the
talent or experience dominated limiting cases the system’s response is trivial and no re-
organization happens. However, Figure 3 shows that prr, the probability that removal of
an individual induces rank reversals, is non-zero in the crossover regime. For N = 100,
8
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FIG. 3. Removal of a group member. In the limiting cases of talent and experience dominated
societies, removal has trivial effect, while in the crossover regime the removal of an individual
causes rank reversals with finite probability (red). The average number of rank reversals Ndiff peaks
near ∆xc (green). Results are shown for populations of N = 100, continuous lines are analytical
solutions [29]. Data points are are simulations of the dynamics defined in Eq. (6), representing an
average of 50,000 time steps and error bars provide the 95% CI.
both prr and the average number of these rank reversals Ndiff peak near, but not exactly
at, the crossover point ∆xc. For removal-induced rank reversals to happen, at least three
consecutively ranked individuals are needed in opposite order with respect to talent, i.e.,
b(k+ 1) > b(k) > b(k− 1). If the condition b(k+ 1)− b(k− 1) > ∆x is satisfied, the removal
of the kth individual allows the (k+ 1)th to pass the (k− 1)th, which can lead to a series of
rank reversals. In other words, the kth individual is not talented enough to further advance
in society, but is capable of holding back a younger, more talented contender.
Understanding the response of hierarchies to external perturbation is an important issue.
Particularly, removal of animals from primate groups can sometimes lead to large shifts
in hierarchy and instabilities endangering the group [14, 25]. Here we demonstrated that
traditional models of hierarchy formation, those only considering either intrinsic abilities or
social feedback, predict trivial response to removal, and that both effects have to be present
simultaneously to observe rank reversals.
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So far we have focused on populations of N = 100 individuals. In the Supplementary
Material, we extract the scaling behavior of various properties for large N [29]. Local quan-
tities, such as τtal(2) and prr, scale as τtal(2) = τ
(1)
tal (2, N∆x) and prr = p
(1)
rr (N∆x) for small
∆x; and are independent of N for large ∆x, i.e., τtal(2) = τ
(2)
tal (2,∆x) and prr = p
(2)
rr (∆x).
The location of their extreme value is at the crossover of these two regimes and in case of
normal talent distribution scales as ∼ (lnN)1/6/N1/3. We find universal bounds
τtal(2) ≥ −2 ln 2 + 1,
prr ≤ 0.294 . . . ,
(7)
for any continuous unbounded talent distribution, and these bounds are reached in the large
population limit. For global talent correlation, on the other hand, we find that τtal → 1
if
√
N∆x → 0 and τtal → 0 if
√
N∆x → ∞. Therefore, the crossover point where τtal =
τexp = 1/2 scales as ∆xc ∼ 1/
√
N . The average number of rank reversals Ndiff depends on
global correlations, and peaks near the crossover point ∆xc. Note that in the parametrization
of the model, provided in Eq. (6), ∆x = δ/[µ(N − 1)]; meaning that for N → ∞, global
correlation becomes talent dominated and local correlation may become negative depending
on the value of N∆x. Other scalings of ∆x are also possible through adjustment of δ or µ,
or if individuals do not randomly select opponents, but selectively compete with similarly
ranked ones. The properties we observed for finite hierarchies may become more pronounced
in the large population limit, for example, if N∆x→∞ but √N∆x→ 0, global correlation
τtal converges to one, while local correlation approaches its theoretical minimum. In Table I,
we provide detailed enumeration of possible behavior in the large population limit assuming
∆xNα = C, where C > 0 is constant.
Discussion. We studied the synergistic effect of talent and social reinforcement on the
structure of competitive social hierarchies, and we identified behaviors that cannot be ob-
served if either effect dominates. Although we derived our model assuming pairwise conflicts
and a winner effect, we believe that the results can be interpreted more generally: (i) The
mechanism behind both local talent-rank anti-correlation and removal-induced rank rever-
sals is that to pass someone in rank it is not enough to be more talented, but the talent
difference has to be sufficient to compensate for the advantage of being higher ranked – a
10
In the limit of N →∞
τtal τexp τtal(2) prr Ndiff/N
1 < α 1 0 1 0 0
α = 1 1 0 τ
(1)
tal (2, C) p
(1)
rr (C) 0
1/2 < α < 1 1 0 −2 ln 2 + 1 0.294 . . . 0
α = 1/2 τtal(C) 1− τtal(C) −2 ln 2 + 1 0.294 . . . f(C)
0 < α < 1/2 0 1 −2 ln 2 + 1 0.294 . . . 0
0 = α 0 1 τ
(2)
tal (2, C) p
(2)
rr (C) 0
α < 0 0 1 0 0 0
TABLE I. Structure of hierarchy in the large population limit assuming ∆xNα = C. The
numerical values are valid for any continuous unbounded talent distribution, while the scaling func-
tions are specific to the talent distribution and are calculated in the Supplementary Material [29].
process relevant to many systems, examples might include rankings of scientists, best seller
lists, or sports rankings. (ii) We introduced parameter b to capture individual talents; how-
ever, it can be thought of as a proxy for support of kin or as a simplified model of reputation
received in exchange for non-adversarial social interactions.
Finally, our results prompt many research questions, both experimental and theoretical.
For example, local anti-correlation and removal-induced rank reversals are predictions that
are testable through experiments. Future theoretical work may investigate sources of com-
plexity not captured by our model, for example, the role of aging or slow deterioration of
talent, or non-linear hierarchies, where social tiers are occupied by multiple individuals.
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S.1. INTRODUCTION
In the Supplementary Material, we provide in detail the analytical solution of the model
of hierarchy formation in large, dynamically changing populations. In Sec. S.2, we introduce
a simplified description of the dynamics of the model in the β → ∞ limit and our overall
approach that ultimately allows analytical solution. In the following four sections, we derive
and analyze the global rank-talent (τtal) and rank-experience (τexp) correlation, the local
rank-talent correlation for window size w = 2 (τtal(2)), the probability of removal-induced
rank reversals (prr), and the expected number of pairwise rank reversals (Ndiff). We identify
the scaling behavior of each quantity for large population sizes. Finally, in Sec. S.7, we
enumerate the possible emergent hierarchies and identify their properties in the infinite
population limit.
S.2. DYNAMICS IN THE β →∞ LIMIT AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH
In this section, we setup the framework that allows us to analytically solve the model for
N > 2 populations where individuals may leave and enter the hierarchy.
2
Consider a group of N individuals indexed i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N , each individual is charac-
terized by intrinsic ability or talent bi drawn from a given random distribution p(b). We
initially allow the population to reach a stable ranking. Then in each step, we remove a
random individual and add a new member j with talent bj to the bottom of the society, i.e.,
xj = 0, and again allow the population to reach a stable ranking.
For simplicity we restrict our investigation to the β →∞ limiting case, in which case Qij
becomes a step function, meaning that i always wins if xi + bi > xj + bj. In a stable ranking,
the score of the kth individual, denoted x(k), is simply
x(k) = (N − k) δ
µ(N − 1) . (S1)
Note that confusingly “high rank” corresponds to small values of k, e.g., k is higher ranked
than k + 1.
The condition for two consecutively ranked individuals to reverse ranks during the tem-
poral evolution of the hierarchy is
b(k + 1) + x(k + 1)− b(k)− x(k) > 0,
b(k + 1)− b(k) > x(k)− x(k + 1) ≡ ∆x = δ
µ(N − 1) ,
(S2)
where b(k) is the intrinsic ability of the individual ranked kth and ∆x is the score separation
between two consecutive individuals. This ∆x is independent of k, and parameters δ and
µ only affect the stable ranking through ∆x; therefore, we treat it as a parameter of the
dynamics. The state of the system is completely described by the ordering of individuals
O = [o(1), o(2), . . . , o(N)], where o(k) is the index of the individual ranked kth.
After adding a new individual to the bottom of the hierarchy, we allow the system to
reach a stable ranking, i.e., we allow the newcomer to rise as its talent allows. As briefly
described in the main text, instead of using the dynamics defined in Eqs. (2) and (3) of
the main text to reach the stable ranking, the condition in Eq. (S2) allows us to employ
a simplified representation of the dynamics: We check each consecutive pair [o(k), o(k + 1)]
(k = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1), and if condition Eq. (S2) is satisfied we reverse their order. We repeat
this until no further change is found. All results for N > 0 populations, reported here and
in the main text rely on this simplified representation.
3
One further observation is required to analytically solve the model: the probability of
observing the ordering O is equal to the probability of creating the same ordering by starting
from a single individual and adding new members one-by-one. More precisely: At time step
t = 1, we start with one individual with intrinsic ability b1. At the time step t = 2, we
add one new individual with intrinsic ability b2 to the bottom of the society. We repeat this
step until the population reaches N individuals. In the following, we calculate properties of
rankings obtained from this alternative process – due to the equivalence these properties will
hold for the original model as well.
Note that here we use b(k) to denote the talent of an individual ranked kth and bt to
denote the talent of an individual added at time step t.
S.3. GLOBAL RANK-TALENT (τtal) AND RANK-EXPERIENCE (τexp) CORRE-
LATION
In this section, we calculate the correlation between rank from the dynamical process and
ranking based on talent or experience. We measure the correlation using the Kendall’s tau
coefficient, which is defined as
τ =
n+ − n−
N(N − 1)/2 , (S3)
where n+ counts the number of pairs that are in the same order in the two rankings that
we compare, and n− counts the number of pairs that are in the opposite order. If the two
rankings are exactly the same, τ = 1; if there is no correlation, τ = 0; and if the two rankings
are exact opposites, τ = −1.
We introduce N tal− (t) as the number of individuals that arrived after t, are more talented
than bt, but ultimately receive a lower rank. Therefore we can express the number of dis-
cordant pairs with respect to rank and talent as n− =
∑N
t=1 N
tal
− (t). Therefore Eq. (S3) for
rank-talent correlation becomes
τtal = 1− 4
N∑
t=1
N tal− (t)
N(N − 1) . (S4)
To calculate N tal− (t), we first define the threshold a(t
′− t, bt), which gives the talent value
below which an individual arriving at t′ > t cannot pass the individual that arrived at t with
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talent bt. According to Eq. (S2), initially talent at least a(1, bt) = bt + ∆x is needed to pass.
This threshold increases to bt+1 + ∆x, if a new individual arrives with talent bt+1, such that
bt < bt+1 < bt + ∆x; otherwise it remains unchanged. To approximate the expectation value
of a(t′ − t, bt), we can write the following recursion
a(t′ + 1− t, bt) = a(t′ − t, bt) +
a(t′−t,bt)∫
a(t′−t,bt)−∆x
p(b)(b+ ∆x− a(t′ − t, bt))db,
a(t+ 1, bt) = bt + ∆x.
(S5)
We can now calculate
N tal− (t) =
∫
dbtp(bt)
N∑
t′=t+1
a(t′−t,bt)∫
bt
p(b)db, (S6)
where the summand is the probability that the individual arriving at t′ is more talented than
bt but cannot pass it. We can now calculate τtal by plugging in N
tal
− (t) into Eq. (S4).
We calculate τexp in a similar fashion. By defining N
exp
− (t) as the number of individuals
that arrived after t and passed the individual that arrived at t; Eq. (S3) for rank-experience
correlation becomes
τexp = 1− 4
N∑
t=1
N exp− (t)
N(N − 1) , (S7)
and we can write
N exp− (t) =
∫
dbtp(bt)
N∑
t′=t+1
∞∫
a(t′−t,bt)
p(b)db, (S8)
together with Eq. (S7) this provides τexp.
It is worth noting that the sum of discordant rank-talent and rank-experience pairs can
be evaluated as
N∑
t=1
[N tal− (t) +N
exp
− (t)] =
N∑
t=1
N∑
t′=t+1
∫
dbtp(bt)
∞∫
bt
p(b)db =
N(N − 1)
4
, (S9)
which is independent of p(b). Inserting this into Eq. (S7) we get
τexp = 1− 4N(N − 1)/4−
∑N
t=1 N
tal
− (t)
N(N − 1) ,
τexp = 1− τtal.
(S10)
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FIG. S1. Global correlations τtal and τexp. (a) Comparing the analytical solution of τtal and
τexp (Eqs. (S5) and (S6)) to numerical simulations shows excellent agreement for various system
sizes. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. (b) Comparing the solution of a(t, b = 0)
obtained from solving the original discrete time Eq. (S5) and the continuous time approximation
Eq (S12). The approximation is accurate for large t and small ∆x. (c) Scaling of τtal. The continuous
time approximation predicts that plotting τtal as a function of ∆x
√
N collapses the values of τtal. We
compare the rescaled discrete time solution of τtal to the scaling function is provided by Eq. (S16),
we find that the scaling is accurate for large populations. (d) The crossover point ∆xc, where
τtal = τexp = 1/2, scales as ∼ 1/
√
N for large populations.
Therefore, the coefficients measuring the global talent-rank and talent-experience correlation
always sum up to one.
We numerically evaluate Eqs. (S5) and (S6) and compare their predictions to simulations.
Figure S1a shows excellent agreement for various population sizes. In the following we extract
the scaling behavior of τtal, τexp, and the crossover point ∆xc (where τtal = τexp = 1/2) for
large population sizes N .
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Continuous time approximation.
To extract the scaling behavior of τtal, we approximate Eq. (S5) for small ∆x as
a(t+ 1, b) = a(t, b) +
1
2
p(a(t, b))∆x2,
a(1, b) = b.
(S11)
We can further simplify this using continuous time approximation, leading to
a˙(t, b) =
1
2
p(a(t, b))∆x2, (S12)
which can be solved by separation of varibles∫
da
p(a)
=
1
2
∆x2t. (S13)
For the standard normal distribution, there is no closed form of a(t, b) available; however, we
can immediately note that a(t, b,∆x) ≡ a(∆x2t, b) for any talent distribution. Figure S1b
compares the solution of a(t, b) using the original Eq. (S5) and the approximations from
Eqs. (S11) and (S12), showing good agreement for small ∆x and large t.
Next, we approximate the sums in Eq. (S6) with integrals and simplify notations:
N∑
t=1
N tal− (t) =
∫
dbp(b)
N∫
1
dt
N∫
t+1
dt′
[
P (a(∆x2[t′ − t], b))− P (b)] . (S14)
Switching the order of integration and evaluating integrals whenever it is possible, we obtain
N∑
t=1
N tal− (t) = N
2
∫ 1
0
ds
∫
dbp(b)(1− s)P (a(s ·∆x2N, b))− N
2
4
, (S15)
where we kept only leading order terms of N , and made the substitution (t′ − t)/N → s.
Inserting the result into Eq. (S4), we get
τtal = 2− 4
∫ 1
0
ds
∫
dbp(b)(1− s)P (a(s ·∆x2N, b)), (S16)
where the approximation is accurate for large populations. We can now see that
(i) The global correlation scales as τtal(∆x,N) ≡ τtal(∆x2N) for large N ; therefore plotting
τtal as a function of ∆x
√
N collapses the values of τtal for large populations (Fig. S1c).
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(ii) It is a direct consequence of point (i) that the crossover point ∆xc, where τtal = τexp =
1/2, scales as ∆xc ∼ 1/
√
N (Fig. S1d).
(iii) If ∆x2N → 0 then τtal → 0, and if ∆x2N →∞ then τtal → 1.
(iv) So far in the calculations, we did not specify p(b); therefore the above properties are
true for any continuous unbounded talent distribution.
We have shown in Eq. (S10) that τexp = 1 − τtal; therefore the scaling behavior of τexp and
τtal is identical.
S.4. LOCAL RANK-TALENT CORRELATION (τtal(w = 2))
In this section, we derive the exact formula and scaling behavior of τtal(w = 2), the
talent-rank correlation coefficient averaged over a sliding window of w = 2, i.e., covering two
consecutively ranked individuals. The window size w = 2 allows us to write
τtal(w = 2) = 1− 2poo, (S17)
where poo is the probability that a randomly selected consecutive pair is in opposite order
with respect to talent, i.e., the individual ranked higher is less talented. For such pairs to
exist the condition
b1 < b2 < b1 + ∆x (S18)
most hold, where b1 and b2 are consecutively ranked and b1 is ranked higher. (For brevity,
we refer to “individual with talent bi” simply as bi.)
To proceed, we first calculate the probability that b2 is introduced j + 1 time steps after
b1:
1. b1 arrives with probability p(b1)db1;
2. j individuals arrive, in order for b2 to be consecutive with b1, all j individuals have to ei-
ther pass b1 or be passed by b2, the probability of this is (1− [P (b1 + ∆x)− P (b2 −∆x)])j,
where P (b) is the cumulative distribution of b;
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3. b2 arrives with probability p(b2)db2.
To obtain poo, we average this over all possible introduction times of b1, sum over the possible
values of j, and average over all values of b1 and b2 that satisfy conditions in Eq. (S18):
poo =
1
N − 1
N−1∑
t=1
∫
p(b1)db1
b1+∆x∫
b1
p(b2)db2
N−t−1∑
j=0
(1− [P (b1 + ∆x)− P (b2 −∆x)])j . (S19)
We evaluate the sums and for simplicity we substitute b1 → b and b2 → b+ y, leading to
poo =
∫
p(b)db
∆x∫
0
p(b+ y)dy
(
1
P (b+ ∆x)− P (b+ y −∆x)−
− 1− P (b+ ∆x) + P (b+ y −∆x)− [1− P (b+ ∆x) + P (b+ y −∆x)]
N
[N − 1][P (b+ ∆x)− P (b+ y −∆x)]2
)
.
(S20)
Numerically evaluating the above formula and inserting its result into Eq. (S17) provides the
exact solution of τtal(w = 2), Fig. S2a shows agreement with simulations for various system
sizes.
Limit of large N and small ∆x.
We now calculate p
(1)
oo , which is poo in the large population limit such that ∆x is small.
To proceed, we expand Eq. (S20) with respect to ∆x, assuming ∆x ∼ N−1 and ignoring
O(N−1) and smaller terms, we obtain
p(1)oo (N,∆x) =
∫
db
∆x∫
0
dy
(
p(b)
1
2∆x− y − p
2(b)
1− exp[−(2∆x− y)p(b)N ]
N [(2∆x− y)p(b)]2
)
=
= ln 2−
∫
db
N∆xp(b)∫
0
dY p(b)
1− exp[−(2N∆xp(b)− Y )]
(2N∆xp(b)− Y )2 ,
(S21)
where we relied on the relation (1 − x)N ≈ e−xN , and in the second integral we made the
substitution yNp(b)→ Y . We immediately note the following:
(i) The second integral is always positive, therefore ln 2 is the maximum value of p
(1)
oo . This
maximum is reached in the N∆x→∞ limit.
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(ii) p
(1)
oo (∆x,N) only depends on N∆x, i.e., p
(1)
oo (N,∆x) ≡ p(1)oo (N∆x); therefore, in case of
small ∆x , plotting poo as a function of N∆x collapses the values of poo for different
population sizes N (Fig. S2b).
(iii) So far in the calculations, we did not specify p(b); therefore the above properties are
true for any continuous unbounded talent distribution.
We now extract the asymptotic behavior of poo(N∆x) in the large N∆x limit. Preforming
the substitution N∆xp(b)→ P , we get
p(1)oo (N∆x) = ln 2−
2
N∆x
N∆x√
2pi∫
0
dP
P∫
0
dY
P√
2 ln N∆x√
2pi
− 2 lnP
1− exp[−(2P − Y )]
(2P − Y )2 . (S22)
The integrand diverges at both P = 0 and P = N∆x√
2pi
; therefore, we separate the first integral
in to two sections [0, 1√
2pi
] and [ 1√
2pi
, N∆x√
2pi
], note that the any O(1) separation point yields the
same asymptotic behavior. Investigating the leading order terms in N∆x, we find that the
integral is dominated by the second section. Keeping only the leading order term, we get
p(1)oo (N∆x) ' ln 2−
2
N∆x
N∆x√
2pi∫
1√
2pi
dP
P∫
0
dY
P√
2 ln N∆x√
2pi
− 2 lnP
1
(2P − Y )2 =
= ln 2−
√
2
√
lnN∆x
N∆x
.
(S23)
Figure S2c compares the exact and asymptotic solution of p
(1)
oo (N∆x).
Limit of large N and ∆x ∼ 1.
We turn our attention to calculating p
(2)
oo , which is poo in the large population limit such
that ∆x ∼ 1. Starting from Eq. (S20) and ignoring O(N−1) and smaller terms, we immedi-
ately obtain
p(2)oo (∆x) =
∫
p(b)db
∆x∫
0
p(b+ y)dy
1
P (b+ ∆x)− P (b+ y −∆x) . (S24)
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To extract the asymptotic behavior of p
(2)
oo (∆x) in the small ∆x limit, we expand the cumu-
lative functions in the denominator around b+ y:
P (b+ ∆x)−P (b+ y −∆x) = P (b+ y) + p(b+ y)(∆x− y) + 1
2
p′(b+ y)(∆x− y)2 + . . .
− P (b+ y) + p(b+ y)∆x− 1
2
p′(b+ y)∆x2 − . . .
= p(b+ y)(2∆x− y) + 1
2
p′(b+ y)
(
(∆x− y)2 −∆x2)+ . . . .
(S25)
First, we focus on the leading order term, substituting back to Eq. (S24):
p(2)oo (N,∆x) −−−→
∆x→0
∫
p(b)db
∆x∫
0
dy
1
2∆x− y = ln 2. (S26)
Interpreting these results we note the following:
(i) Similarly to p
(1)
oo , ln 2 is the maximum value of p
(2)
oo . This maximum is reached in the
∆x→ 0 limit.
(ii) p
(2)
oo (∆x,N) does not depend on N , i.e., p
(2)
oo (N,∆x) ≡ p(2)oo (∆x); therefore, in case of
large ∆x, the values of poo collapse for different system sizes N (Fig. S2d).
(iii) So far in the calculations, we did not specify p(b); therefore the above properties are
true for any continuous unbounded talent distribution.
To extract the small ∆x behavior of p
(2)
oo (∆x), we keep higher order terms of Eq. (S25)
and make use of the fact that for standard normal distribution p′(b) = −bp(b), 〈b〉 = 0, and
〈b2〉 = 1, thus obtaining
p(2)oo (∆x) = ln 2−
(
ln 2− 5
8
)
∆x2. (S27)
Figure S2e compares the exact and asymptotic solution of p
(2)
oo (∆x).
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FIG. S2. Probability of pair in opposite order with respect to talent (poo). (a) Comparing
the analytical solution of poo(N,∆x) (Eq. (S20)) to numerical simulations shows excellent agreement
for various population sizes. (b) Plotting the exact solution of poo (Eq. (S20)) as a function of N∆x
for various population sizes, the values of poo collapse to p
(1)
oo (N∆x) (Eq. (S21)) for small N∆x;
the range of agreement increases with N . (c) Comparing the exact (Eq. (S21)) and asymptotic
(Eq. (S23)) solution of p
(1)
oo (N∆x). (d) Plotting the exact solution of poo (Eq. (S20)) as a function
of ∆x for various system sizes, the values of poo collapse to p
(2)
oo (∆x) (Eq. (S24)) for large ∆x;
the range of agreement increases with N . (e) Comparing the exact (Eq. (S24)) and asymptotic
(Eq. (S27)) solution of p
(2)
oo (∆x). (f) Comparing the scaling behavior of ∆x∗oo (Eq. (S29)) to results
obtained by numerically finding the maximum of the exact poo(N,∆x) (Eq. (S20)).
Location of maximum of poo(N,∆x).
We have calculated poo(N,∆x) in two limits: p
(1)
oo (N∆x), accurate for small ∆x (Fig. S2b);
and p
(2)
oo (∆x), accurate for large ∆x (Fig. S2d). The function p
(1)
oo (N∆x) is monotonic increas-
ing, while function p
(2)
oo (∆x) is monotonic decreasing. Therefore the peak of poo(N,∆x) is at
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the crossover between the two limiting cases:
p(1)oo (N∆x
∗
oo) ∼ p(2)oo (∆x∗oo), (S28)
where ∆x∗oo is the location of the maximum of poo(N,∆x) for fixed N . Using asymptotics
from Eqs. (S23) and (S27), we obtain√
lnN∆x∗oo
N∆x∗oo
∼ ∆x∗oo2 → ∆x∗oo ∼
(lnN)1/6
N1/3
. (S29)
Figure S2f compares the scaling behavior of ∆x∗oo predicted by Eq. (S29) to exact results
obtained by numerically finding the maximum of poo(N,∆x) provided by Eq. (S20).
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FIG. S3. Universal minimum of τtal(w = 2). We show min
∆x
τtal(w = 2, N,∆x) numerically
calculated using Eq. (S20) for the standard normal distribution, the exponential distribution, and
the Pareto distribution. We find that for fixed N , the minimum of τtal(w = 2) depends on the choice
of the talent distribution p(b); however, this minimum approaches −2 ln 2 + 1 for large populations
independent of the details of p(b).
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Universal minimum of τtal(w = 2).
We have shown that ln 2 is the maximum of both p
(1)
oo (N∆x) and p
(2)
oo (∆x) for any con-
tinuous and unbounded p(b). This means that ln 2 is an upper bound of poo(N,∆x), and
therefore
τtal(2) ≥ −2 ln 2 + 1 = −0.386 . . . , (S30)
independent of the choice of p(b) and this minimum is reached in theN →∞ limit. On Fig. S3
we show min
∆x
τtal(w = 2, N,∆x) numerically calculated using Eq. (S20) for the standard
normal distribution, the exponential distribution P (b) = λe−λb for λ = 1, and the Pareto
distribution P (b) = 1−b−α (b > 1) for α = 1.5. We indeed find that the minimum approaches
−2 ln 2 + 1 for all talent distributions.
S.5. PROBABILITY OF REMOVAL-INDUCED RANK REVERSALS (prr)
In this section we calculate prr, the probability that the removal of a random individual
causes rank reversals. Rank reversal is possible through the following process. Consider three
consecutively ranked individuals that have talents b1, b2, and b3, where b1 is ranked highest,
and they are in opposite order with respect to talent, i.e., b1 < b2 < b3. If the conditions
b2 <b1 + ∆x,
b3 <b2 + ∆x,
b3 >b1 + ∆x
(S31)
hold, then the ranking is stable. However, if the middle-ranked individual is removed, b1 and
b3 switches order. (For brevity, we refer to “individual with talent bi” simply as bi.)
To proceed with determining prr, we first calculate the probability that b1 is introduced
j + 1 time steps before b2, and b3 is introduced k + 1 time steps after b2:
1. b1 arrives with probability p(b1)db1;
2. j individuals arrive, in order for b2 to be consecutive with b1, all j individuals have to ei-
ther pass b1 or be passed by b2, the probability of this is (1− [P (b1 + ∆x)− P (b2 −∆x)])j,
where P (b) is the cumulative distribution of b;
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3. b2 arrives with probability p(b2)db2;
4. k individuals arrive, in order for b3 to be consecutive with b2, all k individuals have to ei-
ther pass b2 or be passed by b3, the probability of this is (1− [P (b2 + ∆x)− P (b3 −∆x)])k;
5. b3 arrives with probability p(b3)db3.
To obtain prr, we average this over all possible introduction times of b2, sum over the possible
values of k and j, and average over all values of b1, b2 and b3 that satisfy the conditions in
Eq. (S31):
prr(N,∆x) =
=
1
N
N∑
t=1
∫
p(b1)db1
b1+∆x∫
b1
p(b2)db2
N−t−1∑
k=0
(1− [P (b1 + ∆x)− P (b2 −∆x)])k×
×
b2+∆x∫
b1+∆x
p(b3)db3
t−2∑
j=0
(1− [P (b2 + ∆x)− P (b3 −∆x)])j .
(S32)
We continue following similar steps we used to analyze poo(N,∆x) in Sec. S.4. We evaluate
the sums and for simplicity we substitute b1 → b, b2 → b + y, and b2 → b + ∆x + z, which
leads to
prr(N,∆x) =
1
N
∫
db
∆x∫
0
dy
y∫
0
dz
p(b)p(b+ y)p(b+ ∆x+ z)
[P1 − P2][P3 − P4]
[
N − 1
P1 − P2−
− 1
P3 − P4 +
(
1
P1 − P2 +
1− P3 + P4
P3 − P4 − P1 + P2
)
(1− P1 + P2)N−1+
+
(
1
P3 − P4 −
1− P1 + P2
P3 − P4 − P1 + P2
)
(1− P3 + P4)N−1
]
,
(S33)
where P1 = P (b + ∆x), P2 = P (b + y − ∆x), P3 = P (b + y + ∆x), and P4 = P (b + z).
Figure S4a shows the agreement of Eq. (S33) and simulations for various population sizes.
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FIG. S4. Probability that a random removal induces rank reversals (prr). (a) Comparing
the analytical solution of prr(N,∆x) (Eq. (S33)) to numerical simulations shows excellent agreement
for various population sizes. (b) Plotting the exact solution of prr (Eq. (S33)) as a function of N∆x
for various population sizes, the values of prr collapse to p
(1)
rr (N∆x) (Eq. (S34)) for small N∆x;
the range of agreement increases with N . (c) Comparing the exact (Eq. (S34)) and asymptotic
(Eq. (S36)) solution of p
(1)
rr (N∆x). (d) Plotting the exact solution of prr (Eq. (S33)) as a function
of ∆x for various system sizes, the values of prr collapse to p
(2)
rr (∆x) (Eq. (S37)) for large ∆x;
the range of agreement increases with N . (e) Comparing the exact (Eq. (S37)) and asymptotic
(Eq. (S39)) solution of p
(2)
rr (∆x). (f) Comparing the scaling behavior of ∆x∗rr (Eq. (S40)) to results
obtained by numerically finding the maximum of the exact prr(N,∆x) (Eq. (S33)).
Limit of large N and small ∆x.
We now calculate p
(1)
rr , which is prr in the large population limit such that ∆x is small.
To proceed, we expand Eq. (S33) with respect to ∆x, assuming ∆x ∼ N−1 and ignoring
O(N−1) and smaller terms, we obtain
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p(1)rr (N,∆x) =
1
N
∫
db
∆x∫
0
dy
y∫
0
dz
1
(2∆x− y)(y + ∆x− z)
[
p(b)N − 1
2∆x− y −
1
x+ ∆x− y+
+
(
1
2∆x− y +
1
2y − z −∆x
)
Exp[−(2∆x− y)p(b)N ]+
+
(
1
y + ∆x− z −
1
2y − z −∆x
)
Exp[−(y + ∆x− z)p(b)N ]
]
=
=p(max)rr −
∫
db
∆X∫
0
dY
Y∫
0
dZp(b)
[
1− Exp[−(2∆X − Y )]
2∆X − Y +
+
1− Exp[−(Y + ∆X − Z)]
X + ∆X − Y +
Exp[−(2∆X − Y )]− Exp[−(Y + ∆X − Z)]
2Y − Z −∆X
]
,
(S34)
where we relied on the relation (1 − x)N ≈ e−xN ; in the second integral we made the
substitutions ∆xNp(b)→ ∆X, yNp(b)→ Y , and zNp(b)→ Z; and we defined
p(max)rr = ln 2 · ln 3 + Li2 (1/3)− Li2 (2/3) = 0.2944 . . . , (S35)
where Li2(x) is the second order polylogarithm function. We immediately note the following:
(i) The second integral is always positive, therefore p
(max)
rr is the maximum value of p
(1)
rr .
This maximum is reached in the N∆x→∞ limit.
(ii) p
(1)
rr (∆x,N) only depends on N∆x, i.e., p
(1)
rr (N,∆x) ≡ p(1)rr (N∆x); therefore, in case of
small ∆x , plotting prr as a function of N∆x collapses the values of prr for different
system sizes N (Fig. S4b).
(iii) So far in the calculations, we did not specify p(b); therefore the above properties are
true for any continuous unbounded talent distribution.
Following similar steps as in Sec. S.4, we obtain the asymptotic behavior for large N∆x
p(1)rr (N∆x) ' p(max)rr − 2
√
2 ln 4
3
√
lnN∆x
N∆x
. (S36)
Figure S4c compares the exact and asymptotic solution of p
(1)
rr (N∆x).
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Limit of large N and ∆x ∼ 1.
We turn our attention to calculating p
(2)
rr , which is prr in the large population limit such
that ∆x ∼ 1. Starting from Eq. (S33) and ignoring any O(N−1) or smaller term, we imme-
diately obtain
p(2)rr (∆x) =
∫
p(b)db
∆x∫
0
p(b+ y)dy
y∫
0
p(b+ z + ∆x)dz×
× 1
P (b+ ∆x)− P (b+ y −∆x)
1
P (b+ y + ∆x)− P (b+ z) .
(S37)
Similarly to Sec. S.4, to extract the asymptotic behavior of p
(2)
rr (∆x) in the small ∆x limit, we
expand the cumulative functions in the denominator around b+y and b+z+∆x, respectively.
Focusing on the leading order term, we get
p(2)rr (N,∆x) −−−→
∆x→0
∫
p(b)db
∆x∫
0
dy
y∫
0
dz
1
(2∆x− y)(y − z + ∆x) = p
(max)
rr = 0.2944 . . . . (S38)
Interpreting the results we note the following:
(i) Similarly to p
(1)
rr , p
(max)
rr is the maximum value of p
(2)
rr . This maximum is reached in the
∆x→ 0 limit.
(ii) p
(2)
rr (∆x,N) does not depend on N , i.e., p
(2)
rr (N,∆x) ≡ p(2)rr (∆x); therefore, in case of
large ∆x, the values of prr collapse for different population sizes N (Fig. S4d).
(iii) So far in the calculations, we did not specify p(b); therefore the above properties are
true for any continuous unbounded talent distribution.
To extract the small ∆x behavior of p
(2)
rr (∆x), we keep higher order terms in the expansion
of Eq. (S37) and make use of the fact that for standard normal distribution p′(b) = −bp(b),
〈b〉 = 0, and 〈b2〉 = 1:
p(2)rr (∆x) = p
(max)
rr −
[
2 + 3 ln 2 · ln 3− 4 ln 2 + 3Li2(1/3)− 3Li2(2/3)
]
∆x2. (S39)
Figure S4e compares the exact and asymptotic solution of p
(2)
rr (∆x).
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Location of maximum of prr(N,∆x).
We have calculated prr(N,∆x) in two limits: p
(1)
rr (N∆x), accurate for small ∆x (Fig. S4b);
and p
(2)
rr (∆x), accurate for large ∆x (Fig. S4d). Their scaling properties are identical to
p
(1)
oo (N∆x) and p
(2)
oo (∆x), respectively; therefore, the location of the peak of prr also scales as
∆x∗rr ∼
(lnN)1/6
N1/3
. (S40)
Figure S4f compares the scaling behavior of ∆x∗rr predicted by Eq. (S40) to exact results
obtained by numerically finding the maximum of prr(N,∆x) provided by Eq. (S33).
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FIG. S5. Universal maximum of prr. We show max
∆x
prr(N,∆x) numerically calculated using
Eq. (S20) for the standard normal distribution, the exponential distribution, and the Pareto distri-
bution. We find that for fixed N , the maximum of prr depends on the choice of the talent distribution
p(b); however, this maximum approaches p
(max)
rr = 0.294 . . . for large populations independent of
the details of p(b).
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Universal maximum of poo(N,∆x).
We have shown that p
(max)
rr is the maximum of both p
(1)
rr (N∆x) and p
(2)
rr (∆x) for any
continuous and unbounded p(b). Therefore p
(max)
rr is an upper bound of prr(N,∆x):
prr ≤ p(max)rr = ln 2 · ln 3 + Li2 (1/3)− Li2 (2/3) = 0.294 . . . , (S41)
independent of the choice of p(b) and this maximum is reached in the N → ∞ limit. On
Fig. S5 we show max
∆x
prr(N,∆x) numerically calculated using Eq. (S33) for the standard
normal distributionthe exponential distribution P (b) = λe−λb for λ = 1, and the Pareto
distribution P (b) = 1−b−α (b > 1) for α = 1.5. We indeed find that the maximum approaches
p
(max)
rr for all talent distributions.
S.6. AVERAGE NUMBER OF REMOVAL-INDUCED RANK REVERSALS (Ndiff)
In this section, we calculate Ndiff, the expected number of pairs that reverse order under
the condition that at least one reversal happens. The enumeration of possible events quickly
becomes intractable with increasing number of reversals; therefore we turn to an approximate
method building on Sec. S.3. Our approach is based on the observation that the expectation
value of the global talent-rank correlation τtal is stable, and does not fluctuate widely over
time. That is the effect of the removal of a random individual and the introduction of a new
one at the bottom of the hierarchy on average cancel out each other.
First, we consider the effect of a newly added individual, i.e., an individual added at time
step N with talent bN . We calculate the expected number of individuals that are less talented
than bN , but are not passed by it, in other words, the number of discordant pairs created by
the new individual. The new individual and the one introduced at time step t with talent bt
will form such a discordant pair, if
bt <bN ,
a(N − t, bt) >bN ,
(S42)
where a(N − t, bt) is the threshold calculated in Eq. (S5). Therefore the total number of new
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discordant pairs is
N−1∑
t=1
∫
p(bt)dbt
a(N−t′,bt)∫
bt
p(bN)dbN = N
tal
− (1), (S43)
where the equality follows from Eq. (S6). The function N tal− (t) was introduced in Sec. S.3,
and it counts the number of individuals that arrive after t, have higher talent than the talent
of the individual that arrived at t, but do not pass it.
Second, we consider the effect of removing a random individual. By removing an individual
i, discordant pairs are resolved in two ways: (i) the discordant pairs that i directly participates
in are no longer present and (ii) rank reversals are induced that were previously blocked by i.
(We are ultimately interested in calculating the number of induced rank reversals.) The total
number of discordant pairs is
∑N
t=1 N
tal
− (t), and each pair involves two individuals; therefore
the average number of discordant pairs a random individual participates in is
2
N
N∑
t=1
N tal− (t). (S44)
Since τtal does not change after removing and adding an individual, the total number of
discordant pairs does not change either, mathematically this means
N tal− (1)−
2
N
N∑
t=1
N tal− (t)−N (0)diff = 0, (S45)
where the first term is the effect of adding a new individual (the number of newly created
discordant pairs), the second and third terms are the number of discordant pairs resolved.
From this we calculate N
(0)
diff, and Fig. S6a compares simulations to the analytical predictions,
finding excellent agreement for various population sizes.
Finally, N
(0)
diff counts the events, including when no rank reversals are induced. In the main
text Fig. 3, we show the expected number of pairs that reverse order under the condition
that at least one reversal happens, this can be calculated as
Ndiff =
N
(0)
diff
prr
=
N tal− (1)− 2N
∑N
t=1N
tal
− (t)
prr
, (S46)
where prr is the probability that at least one rank reversal happens, and it is provided by
Eq. (S32). Note that N
(0)
diff is related to global correlations, while the probability that a rank
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reversal happens prr is a local property dependent on the relation of only three consecutive
individuals.
Continuous time approximation.
To determine the scaling behavior of N
(0)
diff(∆x,N), we make use of the continuous time
approximation introduced in Sec. S.3. Following Eq. (S15), we can write
N tal− (1) = N
∫ 1
0
ds
∫
dbp(b)P (a(s ·∆x2N, b))− N
2
,
2
N
N∑
t=1
N tal− (t) = 2N
∫ 1
0
ds
∫
dbp(b)(1− s)P (a(s ·∆x2N, b))− N
2
.
(S47)
Therefore, using Eq. (S45), the average number of rank reversals in the continuous time
approximation is
N
(0)
diff(∆x,N) = N
∫ 1
0
ds
∫
dbp(b)(2s− 1)P (a(s ·∆x2N, b)), (S48)
this result is accurate for large populations. We can now see that
(i) The average number of rank reversals scale as N
(0)
diff(∆x,N) ≡ Nf(∆x2N) for large N ,
where f(x) is the sclaing function defined by Eq. (S48); therefore plotting N
(0)
diff/N as a
function of ∆x
√
N collapses the values of N
(0)
diff for large populations (Fig. S6b).
(ii) Therefore the point ∆x∗diff where N
(0)
diff reaches its maximum, scales as ∆x
∗
diff ∼ 1/
√
N ,
the same as the crossover point ∆xc (Fig. S6c).
(iii) If ∆x2N → 0 then P (a(s·∆x2N, b))→ 0 and if ∆x2N →∞ then P (a(s·∆x2N, b))→ 1
(for s > 0); therefore in both cases the continuous time approximation predicts N
(0)
diff →
0.
(iv) So far in the calculations, we did not specify p(b); therefore the above properties are
true for any continuous unbounded talent distribution.
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FIG. S6. Average number of rank reversals N
(0)
diff. (a) Comparing the discrete time analytical
solution of N
(0)
diff (Eqs. (S45) to numerical simulations shows excellent agreement for various system
sizes. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. (b) The continuous time approximation
predicts that plotting N
(0)
diff/N as a function of ∆x
√
N collapses the values of N
(0)
diff. We compare
the rescaled discrete time solution of N
(0)
diff to the scaling function, provided by Eq. (S48). We find
that the scaling is accurate for large populations. (c) We obtain ∆x∗diff, the location of the peak
of N
(0)
diff, by numerically finding the maximum of Eq. (S45). The location of the peak scales as
∆x∗diff ∼ 1/
√
N for large populations in accordance to the continuous time approximation. We find
that ∆x∗diff is closely related to the crossover point ∆xc.
S.7. PROPERTIES OF THE HIERARCHY IN THE N →∞ LIMIT
In the previous sections, we have showed that local properties (local correlation τtal(2)
and probability of rank reversals prr) and global properties (global correlations τtal, τexp
and the average number of rank reversals N
(0)
diff) have different scaling properties. Therefore
the emergent hierarchy may posses different properties in the large population limit N →
∞ depending on the relationship between N and ∆x. Here we explore possible outcomes
assuming
Nα∆x = C, (S49)
where C is constant.
Note that in the parametrization of the model, provided in Eq. (S2), ∆x = δ/[µ(N − 1)],
i.e., α = 1. Other values of α are also possible through adjustment of δ or µ, or if individuals
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do not randomly select opponents, but selectively compete with similarly ranked ones.
Table SI enumerates the possible emergent hierarchies in the large population limit as a
function of α. The most rich behavior is exhibited by the α = 1/2 case, characterized by both
nonzero global correlation with both talent and experience, maximal local anti-correlation
and rank reversal probability, and large-scale rank rearrangements. Other counterintuitive
scenarios are also possible. For example, for 0 < α < 1/2, despite dynamics that aim to
order the hierarchy according to talent, global talent correlation is zero and local correlation
is negative. We anticipate that talent correlation is positive on an intermediate scale. Finally,
note that negative local correlation and non-zero rank reversal probability are robust features
of the hierarchies, τtal(2) and prr become trivial only for the unrealistic cases of 1 < α and
α < 0.
In the limit of N →∞
τtal τexp τ(2) prr N
(0)
diff/N
1 < α 1 0 1 0 0
α = 1 1 0 1− 2p(1)oo (C) p(1)rr (C) 0
1/2 < α < 1 1 0 1− 2 ln 2 0.2944 . . . 0
α = 1/2 τtal(C) 1− τtal(C) 1− 2 ln 2 0.2944 . . . f (0)(C)
0 < α < 1/2 0 1 1− 2 ln 2 0.2944 . . . 0
0 = α 0 1 1− 2p(2)oo (C) p(2)rr (C) 0
α < 0 0 1 0 0 0
TABLE SI. Structure of hierarchy in the large population limit. The numerical values
are valid for any continuous unbounded talent distribution, while the scaling functions depend on
the particular choice. The scaling functions are defined by the corresponding equations: τtal(C) in
Eq. (S16), p
(1)
oo (C) in Eq. (S21), p
(2)
oo (C) in Eq. (S24), p
(1)
rr (C) in Eq. (S34), p
(2)
rr (C) in Eq. (S37),
and f (0)(C) in Eq. (S48).
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